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Situational factors shape moral judgements in the
trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western
countries in a culturally diverse sample
The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives
(that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements
(that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational
factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an
important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the
universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors
affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral
dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found
that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters,
suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the
Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/
individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

M

oral dilemmas can be portrayed as decisions between two
main conflicting moral principles: utilitarian and deontological. Utilitarian (also referred to as consequentialist)
philosophies1 hold that an action is morally acceptable if it maximizes well-being for the greatest number of people (in terms of saved
lives, for example). On the other hand, deontological philosophy2
evaluates the morality of the action based on the intrinsic nature
of the action (that is, often reflecting greater concern for individual rights and duties3). The dilemma between these two principles
plays a prominent role in law and policy-making decisions, ranging
from decisions of health budget allocations4 to dilemmas related to
self-driving vehicles5. This inherent conflict is well illustrated by the
so-called trolley problem, which has long interested both philosophers and psychologists. One version of the dilemma is presented
as follows:6
You are a railway controller. There is a runaway trolley barrelling
down the railway tracks. Ahead, on the tracks, there are five workmen. The trolley is headed straight for them, and they will be killed
if nothing is done. You are standing some distance off in the train
yard, next to a lever. If you pull this lever, the trolley will switch to a
side track and you can save the five workmen on the main track. You
notice that there are two workmen on the side track. So there will
be two workmen who will be killed if you pull the lever and change
the tracks, but the five workmen on the main track will be saved. Is
it morally acceptable for you to pull the lever?
A deontological decision-maker would argue that pulling the
lever is morally unacceptable, as it would be murder. (Note that
deontological principles are often more complicated than this.
Some of the deontological rules would allow for killing in this situation. The terms ‘deontological’ and ‘utilitarian/consequentialist’
are labels we use to refer to certain responses.) On the other hand,
utilitarianism would suggest that it is morally acceptable to pull the
lever, as it would maximize the number of lives saved.

In an alternative version of the dilemma, one has to push a man
off a footbridge in front of the trolley (the ‘footbridge’ scenario).
This man will die but will stop the trolley, and the five people in the
way of the trolley will be saved. Interestingly, people are less likely to
make a decision consistent with utilitarian perspectives in the footbridge scenario compared with the standard switch scenario. (We
call these ‘utilitarian’ responses, but the fact that these decisions are
consistent with utilitarianism does not indicate that people gave
them out of utilitarian principles. The same is true for ‘deontological’ responses7,8.) The difference between the utilitarian response
rate in those scenarios became the basis of investigations of many
influential cognitive theories in the field of moral judgement3,7–13.
The fact that people respond differently to the two trolley dilemmas
was proposed to be explained by people’s adherence to the so-called
doctrine of double effect6,9. A simple version of this doctrine is that
harm is permissible as an unintentional side-effect of a good result.
This doctrine is the basis of many policies in several countries all
around the world concerning issues such as abortion6, euthanasia14,
international armed conflict regulations15,16 and even international
business ethics17. According to this doctrine, it is morally impermissible to bomb civilians to win a war, even if ending the war would
eventually save more lives. However, if civilians die in a bombing of
a nearby weapons factory as a side-effect, the bombing is morally
acceptable. The way people perceive or act on these moral rules can
influence the policies that are accepted or even followed, as we can
already see in the case of driverless cars, which sometimes have to
decide between sacrificing their own passengers and saving one or
more pedestrians5.
However, Greene et al.18 and Cushman et al.9 argued that the difference in utilitarian response rates cannot simply be explained by
the doctrine of double effect. Greene et al. presented evidence for
the interaction of the intention of harm (that is, harm as means or
side-effect, referring to the doctrine of double effect) and personal

A full list of affiliations appears at the end of the paper.
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Table 1 | Summary of sample sizes and exclusions in all cultural clusters
Eastern

Southern

Western

All

3,877

5,333

18,292

27,502

Reason to exclude
N without exclusion
Careless responding

156 (4.0%)

82 (1.5%)

256 (1.4%)

494 (1.8%)

Confusion

752 (19.4%)

658 (12.3%)

1,718 (9.4%)

3,128 (11.4%)

Familiarity with moral dilemmas

1,669 (43.0%)

2,501 (46.9%)

10,332 (56.5%)

14,502 (52.7%)

Technical problem

531 (13.7%)

413 (7.7%)

1,225 (6.7%)

2,169 (7.9%)

Non-native speaker

347 (9.0%)

177 (3.3%)

1,305 (7.1%)

1,829 (6.7%)

Failed attention check (study1a)

720 (18.6%)

943 (17.7%)

1,311 (7.2%)

2,974 (10.8%)

Failed attention check (study 1b)

849 (21.9%)

1,042 (19.5%)

1,336 (7.3%)

3,227 (11.7%)

Failed attention check (study 2a)

1,102 (28.4%)

1,071 (20.1%)

4,900 (26.8%)

7,073 (25.7%)

Failed attention check (study 2b)

1,195 (30.8%)

1,367 (25.6%)

5,528 (30.2%)

8,090 (29.4%)

Final sample
Study 1a

381

622

566

1,569

Study 1b

327

553

546

1,426

Study 2a

323

690

2,971

3,984

Study 2b

277

576

2,660

3,513

Note. Study 1b and study 2b refer to the speedboat dilemmas. Recall that all of our subjects responded to one trolley and one speedboat dilemma.

force (that is, whether or not the agent had to use personal effort to
kill the victim and save more people) on moral acceptability ratings.
More concretely, people were less likely to judge sacrificing one person to save more people as morally acceptable when they had to use
their personal force to kill the person and the death of this person was
required to save more people (this is what is meant by intending the
harm). Hence, they concluded that people are more sensitive to the
doctrine of double effect when they have to use their own physical
force. Despite some exceptions19,20, most of the evidence for this conclusion comes from samples from Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich, Democratic (WEIRD)21 societies, leaving the question open of
whether these effects are psychologically universal or culture specific.
This study tests three cross-cultural hypotheses:
(1) The effects of personal force on moral judgements are culturally
universal.
(2) The interactional effect of personal force and intention on
moral judgements is culturally universal.
(3) Collectivism–individualism has a moderating effect on the
degree to which personal force and intention affect moral
judgements in such a way that their effect is stronger in more
collectivistic cultures.
The first and second hypotheses, that the effects of personal
force and intention on moral judgements are culturally universal,
come from their relatedness to interpersonal violence. People seem
to exhibit a general tendency to avoid causing violent harms (for
example, murder)22,23, and they are more likely to perceive actions
as violent or harmful when they are supposed to use personal
force or intention3. As a result, people are more likely to behave in
a deontological way when personal force or intention is present in
the dilemma. As all cultures regulate interpersonal violence24, we
expected to find that both intention and personal force, as well as
their interaction, have an effect on moral judgements across cultures. The literature seems to be in accordance with these hypotheses. For example, Chinese25–27 and Russian21 participants responded
similarly to moral dilemmas as people from the United States and
Western Europe, and even small-scale societies tended to be susceptible to the effect of intention19,20.

Even though we anticipated that the effect of personal force and
intention would emerge universally across cultures, we nonetheless
expected cultural differences to moderate these effects. The effect of
personal force on moral judgement has been attributed to emotional
processes9,28–30, specifically social emotions (such as guilt, shame or
regret)31,30. The potential use of personal force makes people feel guilt
or shame before making a decision and, therefore, rating actions that
use personal force as morally less acceptable. There is a convincing
argument that these social emotions are universal32–34, despite some
cultural variation in their intensity and the social contexts in which
they are experienced32–34. It has been argued that shame and guilt are
more important in interdependent, collectivistic cultures (as their
function is argued to be linked to social control). People living in East
Asian countries have reported experiencing these emotions more
frequently and more intensely32–34. Other findings suggest that it is
anxiety that mediates the effect of intention and personal force28, but
anxiety (social anxiety in particular) has also been positively associated with collectivism35, pointing to the same direction. Hence, we
hypothesized that people living in collectivistic cultures would judge
actions that involve personal force and intention as morally less
acceptable than people in individualistic cultures. Utilitarian responding in moral dilemma judgements has also been associated with low
levels of empathic concern36, and people living in collectivistic cultures
have been suggested to exhibit higher levels of empathic concern37,38.
Hence, we predicted that individualism–collectivism would also have
an effect on utilitarian responding: collectivists would be less utilitarian in general, because of their higher levels of empathic concern.
In addition to testing our confirmatory hypotheses, we also collected a number of additional country-level as well as individual
measures for exploratory purposes. These measures, such as economic status39, individual-level individualism–collectivism39 and
religiosity40, have been previously shown to be related to moral
judgement. We also administered an alternative measure of utilitarian responding41–44.
The present investigation is crucial for advancing the field for the
following reasons:
1.
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Fig. 1 | Results of study 1 (effect of personal force). a–d, Results for trolley (a,b) and speedboat dilemmas (c,d) with all exclusion criteria applied (a,c)
or including familiar participants (b,d). Error bars show 95% CI around the mean. Scale ranges from 1 (completely unacceptable) to 9 (completely
acceptable). Trolley problem: n = 1,569 when all exclusion criteria applied, and n = 3,524 when familiarity exclusion not applied. Speedboat dilemma:
n = 1,426 when all exclusion criteria applied, and n = 3,295 when familiarity exclusion not applied.

2.
3.

Our knowledge on the cultural universality of the effect of personal force and intention in moral judgements is scarce.
The resulting database (with many types of trolley problems
and additional measures) could assist and guide future research
and applications on moral thinking.

Overview. In the first part of our study, we tested the universality of
the role of personal force in moral judgements with a direct replication of study 1 conducted by Greene et al. In their study, the authors
found evidence that the application of personal force decreases the
moral acceptability of the utilitarian action (hypotheses 1a and 1b).
In the second part, we tested the universality of the interactional
effect of personal force and intention on moral dilemma judgements, by replicating study 2 of Greene et al. (hypotheses 2a and
2b) with partially different moral dilemmas. Furthermore, we tested
our hypothesis that collectivism moderates the effect of intention
and personal force (hypothesis 3). In addition, we collected various
additional measures for exploratory purposes.

Results

We collected data from 27,502 participants from 45 countries. Due
to our exclusion criteria, we had to exclude 80.6% of the sample
from the main analysis (see Table 1 for the various exclusion criteria). Note that, as we registered, we conducted the analysis without
excluding the data of the participants who were familiar with the
trolley problem (36.2% exclusions), and we also conducted a post
hoc explorative analysis in which we applied no exclusion criteria.
All participants were presented with two moral dilemmas that were
equivalent in structure but different in wording: trolley dilemmas
882

and speedboat dilemmas. The former described a situation involving a trolley and people on the tracks, while the latter described a
situation with people on a speedboat and others drowning in the
sea. In study 1, we tested the effect of personal force on moral
dilemma judgements (hypotheses 1a and 1b), while in study 2, we
tested the interaction effect between personal force and intention
(hypothesis 2a, 2b and 3).
The effect of personal force. The findings are presented in Fig. 1.
To test the effect of personal force on moral judgement, we used
one-sided t tests. Consistent with our preregistration, we analysed
only the continuous acceptability ratings (on a scale from 1 to 9)
but not the binary choices. In each cultural cluster, we found at least
strong evidence (Bayes factor (BF10) > 10) of an effect of personal
force on moral judgement, which implies that the effect is culturally
universal. The results indicate that, when personal force is seen to
be necessary to save more lives, people are less likely to favourably
judge a consequentialist outcome (that is, save more people). The
results remained robust across dilemma contexts (that is, the trolley
or speedboat version) and when including participants who were
very familiar with these trolley problem-type scenarios. Therefore,
our results replicated the findings of Greene et al. in the original cultural setting (H1a) and in the Southern and Eastern cultural clusters
(H1b). The statistical results are summarised in Table 2.
The interaction effect of personal force and intention. Figure 2
shows that, when we applied all the exclusion criteria, we found
strong evidence in the Western cluster (hypothesis 2a) for the interaction between personal force and intention (BF10 = 1.5 × 1011), but
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Table 2 | Effect of personal force on moral dilemma judgements
Dilemma and exclusion

Cluster

BF

Trolley applying all exclusion

Eastern

1.9 × 102

Southern

2.44 × 10

Western

80.1

Eastern

Trolley including familiar

t

df

p

Cohen’s d

Raw
effect

89% CI

−3.69

366.23

<0.001

0.38

0.85

0.39–1.12

1.00 × 10 to 2.80 × 10

−6.32

619.93

<0.001

0.51

1.10

0.76–1.33

1.20 × 10−2 to 4.30

−3.41

553.15

0.001

0.29

0.59

0.24–0.79

9.21 × 104

<1.50 × 10−5 to 6.50 × 103

−5.19

806.76

<0.001

0.36

0.79

0.51–1

Southern

5.91 × 1012

<1.00 × 10−5 to 5.50 × 1011

−8.09

1,345.85

<0.001

0.44

0.94

0.73–1.1

Western

4.95 × 10

<1.00 × 10−5 to 2.90 × 104

−5.51

1,338.48

<0.001

0.30

0.65

0.43–0.8

1.16 × 105

1.80 × 10−5 to 1.70 × 104

−5.26

283.92

<0.001

0.59

1.18

0.77–1.47

Southern

1.01 × 10

1.30 × 10 to 74.00

−4.19

436.86

<0.001

0.37

0.72

0.37–0.93

Western

25.2

3.30 × 10−2 to 1.20

−3.01

437.36

0.003

0.27

0.51

0.18–0.72

Eastern

2.4 × 104

<6.00 × 10−5 to 1.70 × 103

−4.88

680.10

<0.001

0.37

0.74

0.46–0.95

Southern

7.8 × 10

<1.00 × 10 to 5.50 × 10

−5.94

908.97

<0.001

0.36

0.69

0.49–0.85

Western

5.53 × 107

<1.00 × 10−5 to 4.0 × 106

−6.34

1,140.72

<0.001

0.35

0.71

0.51–0.87

Speedboat applying all exclusion Eastern

Speedboat including familiar

RR
7.00 × 10−3 to 14.00
7

5

−5

6

−3

3

−5

6

5

Note. RR, robustness region of the prior
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Intention
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Fig. 2 | Results of study 2 (personal force and intention interaction). a–d, Results for trolley (a,b) and speedboat dilemmas (c,d) with all exclusion criteria
applied (a,c) and including familiar participants (b,d). Error bars represent 95% CI. Scale ranged from 1 (completely unacceptable) to 9 (completely
acceptable). Trolley problem: n = 3,984 when all exclusion criteria applied, and n = 9,844 when familiarity exclusion not applied. Speedboat dilemma,
n = 3,513 when all exclusion criteria applied, and n = 9,006 when familiarity exclusion not applied.

moderate inconclusive evidence in the Southern (BF10 = 9.4) and
weak, inconclusive evidence in the Eastern clusters (BF10 = 0.6)
(hypothesis 2b). More concretely, in the Western cluster, participants judged the acceptability of consequentialist decisions much
lower when both personal force and intention had to be applied (that
is, the personal force effect was numerically greater when intention
also had to be applied). When we included participants who were
familiar with the trolley dilemma, we still found strong evidence
in the Western cluster (BF10 = 1.28 × 1030) and, interestingly, we also
found strong evidence in the Southern cluster (BF10 = 3.1 × 106),
but the evidence remained weak and inconclusive in the Eastern

cluster (BF10 = 2.9). Although in the preregistration we expected the
effect sizes to be smaller when participants familiar with the trolley problem were included, we observed the direct opposite: when
including data of participants familiar with the trolley problem,
we found either equivalent or larger effect sizes in all cultural clusters. Notably, the size of the effect almost doubled in the Southern
cluster when running the analysis on the sample with familiar and
unfamiliar participants included (ηp2 increased from 0.014 to 0.026).
All statistical results are presented in Table 3.
On the speedboat dilemmas, we found strong evidence for the
interaction in the Western cluster, regardless of the familiarity
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Table 3 | Interaction between personal force and intention on moral judgements
Dilemma and exclusion

Cluster

BF

RR

Trolley applying exclusion

Trolley including familiar

Speedboat applying exclusion

Speedboat including familiar

b

89% CI

p

Partial η2

Raw effect

Eastern

0.59

2.20 × 10 to 0.64

0.027

−0.16 to 0.19

0.84

0.000

0.11

Southern

9.35

2.75 × 10−2 to 0.2

−0.250

−0.35 to −0.09

0.002

0.014

−1.00

Western

1.54 × 10

5.80 × 10 to 1.80 × 10

−0.306

−0.36 to −0.24

<0.001

0.019

−1.23

Eastern

2.85

2.50 × 10−2 to 1.35

−0.213

−0.33 to −0.03

0.031

0.008

−0.85

−2

11

−5

3

Southern

3.08 × 106

2.23 × 10−3 to 60

−0.348

−0.43 to −0.25

<0.001

0.026

−1.39

Western

1.28 × 1030

<1.00 × 10−5 to 3.70 × 109

−0.292

−0.33 to −0.25

<0.001

0.018

−1.17

Eastern

0.43

4.60 × 10 to 0.69

−0.007

−0.17 to 0.2

0.959

0.000

−0.03

Southern

0.36

5.10 × 10−2 to 0.65

0.028

−0.12 to 0.16

0.794

0.000

0.11

Western

222

3.60 × 10−2 to 1.15

−0.160

−0.22 to −0.08

<0.001

0.005

−0.64

−2

Eastern

0.42

4.50 × 10 to 0.6

0.010

−0.14 to 0.16

0.926

0.000

0.04

Southern

1.13

3.20 × 10−2 to 0.94

−0.132

−0.23 to 0.01

0.097

0.002

−0.53

Western

4.75 × 107

6 × 10−4 to 75

−0.152

−0.19 to −0.11

<0.001

0.005

−0.61

−2

Note. RR, robustness region of the prior

exclusion (BFall exclusions = 222, BFwith familiar = 4.8 × 107). However, we
found inconclusive evidence in the Eastern and Southern clusters,
both before (BFEastern = 0.4, BFSouthern = 0.4) and after (BFEastern = 0.4;
BFSouthern = 1.1) familiarity exclusions. Although our results were
consistent in the Western and Eastern clusters for both the speedboat and trolley dilemmas, there was a divergence in the Southern
cluster. Specifically, we found strong evidence only for the interaction in the Southern cluster when we included familiar participants
in the analysis. In general, in all clusters, the observed effect sizes
were smaller on the speedboat than on the trolley dilemma.
In summary, we conclude that we fully replicated the findings
of Greene et al. with respect to the interaction of personal force
and intention in the Western cluster (hypothesis 2a) regardless of
dilemma context or exclusion criteria. However, the evidence was
inconclusive for all analyses of the Eastern cluster. In the Southern
cluster, the conclusion is both context dependent (that is, the effect
was only detectable in the trolley dilemma) and sensitive to exclusion criteria (that is, the effect was only detectable when familiar
participants were included).
To explore whether our results were sensitive to our choice of priors in the Bayesian analysis, we computed robustness regions (RRs)
that indicate the region of priors within which our inference would
remain unchanged. The width of this region shows how robust our
inferences are to our selection of priors. The RRs were generally wide
for all statistical tests (Tables 2 and 3), indicating that our results were
not sensitive to our choices of prior. Thus, we would arrive at the
same conclusions with any possible prior within the realistic range.
One exception to this finding where the final conclusion was prior
dependent can be found in the analysis of the Southern cluster in
study 2. Specifically, if the scale of the prior distribution had been
r = 0.21 or higher (instead of r = 0.19), we could have concluded that
there was strong evidence for the effect (instead of saying that the test
is inconclusive). Here, we would like to stress that we did not reach
our registered sample size in this cluster for study 2 (we registered
that, for 95% power, we would need 1,800 participants in each cluster
after exclusions, of which we only reached 323 in the Eastern and 690
in the Southern, but we did reach the desired n in the Western cluster
with 2,971 participants; see Methods section for details on sample
size estimation). This could explain why our results did not reach our
evidence thresholds and remained inconclusive.
Cultural correlates. To test the ‘effects’ of cultural variables, we used
linear mixed models predicting moral acceptability ratings from
different cultural variables with the random intercept of countries.
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We tested all five cultural variables one by one (that is, country-level
collectivism, and the four individual-level measures of horizontal
and vertical collectivism–individualism), in separate linear models
on the data with and without familiarity exclusion.
Hypothesis 3 stated that we expected a three-way interaction
between country-level collectivism, intention and personal force.
We first tested this hypothesis on the data with familiarity exclusion
applied (see Table 4 for the statistical results and Fig. 3 for a graphical representation of the findings). The results of the country-level
collectivism scale were inconclusive (trolley: BF10 = 1.2; speedboat:
BF10 = 0.9). When analysing the individual-level measures of horizontal and vertical collectivism–individualism, all results were inconclusive. We conducted the same analysis on the sample but this time
including participants who were familiar with these types of moral
dilemmas, but the results were still inconclusive (trolley: BF10 = 2.2;
speedboat: BF10 = 0.7). Analysing the individual-level individualism–collectivism measures, we found inconclusive evidence in all
the scales. In the Introduction (stage 1), we also hypothesized that
country-level collectivism would be associated with decreased overall acceptability of the utilitarian option. This hypothesis was not
included in the registered analysis plan. Nevertheless, we added
this analysis to the Supplementary Analysis Section 3. In short, we
found no evidence for the association between country-level collectivism and moral acceptability rates. Interestingly, nevertheless,
we found strong evidence for a positive correlation between vertical
individualism and moral acceptability ratings.
We conducted the same analysis on the speedboat dilemmas.
Table 4 and Fig. 4 present the findings. Regardless of the familiarity
exclusion criteria, we found inconclusive results in all cases.
Exploratory analysis. The effect of intention. We registered that we
would test the main effect of intention by comparing the standard
switch (no intention) and footbridge switch (intention) dilemmas. We found strong evidence in each cultural cluster and in each
dilemma type for the effect of intention (BF10 > 10). Importantly,
the effect of intention remained unchanged even when we included
participants who were familiar with moral dilemmas in the sample
(BF10 > 10). Tables 5 and 6 summarize the findings. As registered,
we also tested the effect of physical force on moral judgement. In
accordance with Greene et al., we found no evidence for this effect.
See details in Supplementary Analysis Section 2.1.
No exclusion analysis (post hoc). As the exclusion rate in the
above analyses was very high (81%), we explored our results while
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Table 4 | Individualism–collectivism associations with the interaction between personal force and intention on moral judgements
(trolley dilemmas)
With familiarity exclusion

No familiarity exclusion

Dilemma

Variable

BF

b

89% CI

p

BF

b

89% CI

p

Trolley

Country-level collectivism

1.17

−1.13

−3.17 to 1.12

0.405

2.17

−1.27

−2.53 to −0.11

0.096

Horizontal collectivism

1.66

−0.03

−0.06 to 0.01

0.263

2.31

−0.03

−0.05 to 0

0.096

Horizontal individualism

0.70

0.00

−0.04 to 0.04

0.921

0.94

0.02

−0.01 to 0.04

0.325

Vertical collectivism

0.88

0.00

−0.03 to 0.04

0.988

0.71

−0.01

−0.03 to 0.01

0.538

Vertical individualism

0.72

−0.02

−0.05 to 0.02

0.451

0.45

−0.01

−0.03 to 0.01

0.607

Country-level collectivism

0.91

0.66

−1.43 to 2.9

0.631

0.66

−0.32

−1.61 to 0.83

0.684

Horizontal collectivism

3.11

−0.04

−0.08 to 0

0.114

0.91

−0.01

−0.04 to 0.01

0.396

Horizontal individualism

1.11

−0.01

−0.05 to 0.03

0.611

0.70

0.00

−0.02 to 0.03

0.852

Vertical collectivism

1.53

0.02

−0.01 to 0.06

0.311

0.96

0.01

−0.01 to 0.04

0.357

Vertical individualism

0.70

0.00

−0.04 to 0.03

0.952

0.54

0.01

−0.01 to 0.03

0.590

Speedboat

a

b

Trolley problem (all exclusions applied)
0.15

Trolley problem (familiarity exclusion not applied)
0.15

MYS
PHL

PHL

KAZ

KAZ

0.10

ARG
BRA

HUN

PER

0.10

PER
BRA

ARG

HUN
COL

MEX

FRA

PAK
ROU
CHN GBR
RUS
IND
TUR
IRN

0.05

Collectivism

Collectivism

COL

CHE
BGR

ROU
CHN
GBR
RUS
TUR IND

0.05

AUS
NZL
CAN
SRB

0.1

0
0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5
η2

0.6

0.7

0.8

Eastern
Southern
Western

CHE
POL
NLD

ESP

AUS NZL
CAN SGP
SRB

SGP

USA

0

BGR

DEU

ITA

ESP

MEX
JPN

IRN

NLD
DEU

0

CHL
PAK

POL

ITA

FRA

0.9

USA

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

η2

Fig. 3 | Correlation between country-level collectivism and effect size of the interaction between personal force and intention on the trolley problem.
a,b, Correlation between country-level collectivism and the η2 effect size of the interaction between personal force and intention with all exclusion criteria
applied (a) and including familiar participants (b) on the trolley problem. The size of the circles indicates the size of the sample in a given country. The
blue line is the weighted regression. MYS, Malaysia; CHN, China; IND, India; THA, Thailand; MKD, Macedonia; PAK, Pakistan; IRN, Iran; JPN, Japan; GBR,
Great Britain; FRA, France; HUN, Hungary; COL, Colombia; ARG, Argentina; TUR, Turkey; ECU, Ecuador; CHL, Chile; PER, Peru; PHL, Philippines; MEX,
Mexico; USA, United States; SRB, Serbia; RUS, Russia; DEU, Germany; CAN, Canada; POL, Poland; ITA, Italy; KAZ, Kazakhstan; NZL, New Zealand; NLD,
The Netherlands; ROU, Romania; BRA, Brazil; SGP, Singapore; ESP, Spain; AUS, Australia; BGR, Bulgaria; CHE, Switzerland.

applying no exclusion criteria (including all participants). In study
1, we found strong evidence for the individual effects of personal
force and intention, in each of the three cultural clusters, in both
the speedboat and the trolley dilemmas, just as in our main analyses (see Extended Data Figs. 1 and 2 for the detailed results and
data distribution).
For study 2, Extended Data Fig. 3 summarizes the statistical findings. Overall, we can conclude that almost all of our results regarding the effects of personal force and its interaction with intention
are not sensitive to our exclusion. Only in the case of the Eastern

cluster can we see a difference: without applying exclusions, strong
evidence can be found for the effect of personal force and intention
in the trolley dilemma, whereas otherwise, we find inconclusive evidence. Here, we can only speculate whether the increased strength
of evidence is due to the increased number of participants. The
analysis on the speedboat dilemmas yielded the same results with
and without exclusions: inconclusive evidence in the Eastern and
Southern clusters, and strong evidence in the Western cluster (see
Extended Data Fig. 4 for the findings of study 2). Thus, it appears
that applying such strong exclusion criteria did not strengthen the
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Speedboat problem (all exclusions applied)
0.15

Speedboat problem (familiarity exclusion not applied)
0.15

MYS
PHL

PHL

KAZ

KAZ
PER

0.10

BRA

ARG
HUN

PER

0.10

ARG
HUN

BRA

COL
FRA

Collectivism

Collectivism

COL
MEX

PAK
CHN
ROU
IND
RUS TUR
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BGR

GBR

IRN

CHL PAK
GBR

NLD
ITA

0.05

DEU

0

0.1

0
0.2

ESP

AUS
NZL
CAN
SGP
SRB

USA

0

Eastern
Southern
Western

POL

ITA

ESP

CAN
SRB

JPN

NLD
DEU

NZL
SGP

AUS

MEX

ROU
CHN
RUS
TUR IND
CHE
BGR
IRN

POL

0.05

FRA

η2

0.3

0.4

0.5

USA

0

0.2

η2

0.4

0.6

Fig. 4 | Correlation between country-level collectivism and effect size of the interaction between personal force and intention on the speedboat
problem. a,b, Correlation between country-level collectivism and the η2 effect size of the interaction between personal force and intention with all
exclusion criteria applied (a) and including familiar participants (b) on the speedboat problem. The size of the circles indicates the size of the sample in
a given country. The blue line is the weighted regression. MYS, Malaysia; CHN, China; IND, India; THA, Thailand; MKD, Macedonia; PAK, Pakistan; IRN,
Iran; JPN, Japan; GBR, Great Britain; FRA, France; HUN, Hungary; COL, Colombia; ARG, Argentina; TUR, Turkey; ECU, Ecuador; CHL, Chile; PER, Peru; PHL,
Philippines; MEX, Mexico; USA, United States; SRB, Serbia; RUS, Russia; DEU, Germany; CAN, Canada; POL, Poland; ITA, Italy; KAZ, Kazakhstan; NZL,
New Zealand; NLD, The Netherlands; ROU, Romania; BRA, Brazil; SGP, Singapore; ESP, Spain; AUS, Australia; BGR, Bulgaria; CHE, Switzerland..

replication effort nor substantially alter the inferences we draw
about the replicability of the effect of force and intention.
We also conducted the cultural analysis without applying any
exclusion criteria, finding that all of the results were inconclusive,
with one exception. In the speedboat dilemma, we found moderate evidence that country-level collectivism is positively associated
with the interaction of personal force and intention (in line with our
hypothesis; BF10 = 5.1; same test for the trolley dilemma: BF10 = 2.8).
We also found moderate evidence (BF10 = 9.8) that, in the trolley
dilemma, the interaction between personal force and intention is
positively associated with individual-level horizontal collectivism:
being higher on horizontal collectivism means a heightened personal force and intention interaction effect size (Extended Data
Figs. 5 and 6; the same test in the speedboat dilemma was inconclusive: BF10 = 0.54). Thus, for the moderation of the effect by
country-level collectivism, the strict exclusion criteria may have
hurt our ability to detect these effects. Although these results appear
in line with our prior hypothesis, this analysis was only exploratory, not registered a priori, and hence should only be interpreted
with caution.
As we registered, we added a figure showing the distribution
of responses of both subscales of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale
for each country cluster, and also reported means and 95% CI, as
registered. Moreover, we also added a post hoc analysis correlating each subscale of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale with the moral
acceptability ratings of the moral dilemmas. We found that moral
acceptability ratings correlate higher with the instrumental harm
subscale (r = 0.40–0.45) than with the impartial beneficence subscale
(r = 0.05–0.20), with this latter correlation exhibiting somewhat
larger cultural variations. Details can be found in Supplementary
Analysis Section 2.4.
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Discussion

For centuries, philosophers and psychologists have explored the
determinants of moral judgements. Moral dilemmas that force
life-and-death decisions help us to explore which norms and psychological processes drive our moral preferences. Initially, researchers thought45,46 that people are simply susceptible to the doctrine of
double effects when making moral judgements, that is, that harm
is permissible if it occurs as an unintentional side-effect of an overall good outcome. Greene et al.18, however, showed that the role of
using physical force to kill one (and save more) influenced moral
judgements even more than did the intentionality of an action.
In this research, we replicated the design of Greene et al.18 using
a culturally diverse sample across 45 countries to test the universality of their results. Overall, our results support the proposition
that the effect of personal force on moral judgements is likely culturally universal. This finding makes it plausible that the personal
force effect is influenced by basic cognitive or emotional processes
that are universal for humans and independent of culture. Our findings regarding the interaction between personal force and intention
were more mixed. We found strong evidence for the interaction
of personal force and intention among participants coming from
Western countries regardless of familiarity and dilemma context
(trolley or speedboat), fully replicating the results of Greene et al.18.
However, the evidence was inconclusive among participants from
Eastern countries in all cases. Additionally, this interaction result
was mixed for participants from countries in the Southern cluster.
We only found strong enough evidence when people familiar with
these dilemmas were included in the sample and only for the trolley
(not speedboat) dilemma.
Our general observation is that the size of the interaction was
smaller on the speedboat dilemmas in every cultural cluster. It is
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Table 5 | The effect of intention on moral dilemma judgements (trolley dilemmas)
Exclusion
Exclusion

Include familiar

No exclusion

Cluster

BF

t

df

p

Cohen’s d

Raw effect

89% CI

−3.13

159.97

0.002

0.41

0.99

0.34 to 1.36

Southern

4.29 × 106

−6.00

214.10

<0.001

0.64

1.47

0.99 to 1.78

Western

15

1.95 × 10

−8.90

571.04

<0.001

0.70

1.46

1.17 to 1.7

Eastern

6.05 × 102

−3.93

234.76

<0.001

0.40

0.91

0.49 to 1.2

Southern

5.29 × 1013

−8.63

499.67

<0.001

0.61

1.34

1.04 to 1.55

Western

3.3 × 10

Eastern

Eastern
Southern
Western

35.5

−12.84

1,278.97

<0.001

0.64

1.33

1.15 to 1.47

30.6

−3.07

1,060.61

0.002

0.17

0.39

0.18 to 0.57

1.61 × 1014

−8.46

1,421.86

<0.001

0.40

0.89

0.7 to 1.04

−11.01

2,999.62

<0.001

0.34

0.72

0.62 to 0.82

34

2.89 × 10

26

yet unclear whether this effect is caused by some deep-seated (and
unknown) differences between the two dilemmas (for example,
participants experiencing smaller emotional engagement in the
speedboat dilemmas that changes response patterns) or by some
unintended experimental confound (for example, an effect of
the order of presentation of the dilemmas). Furthermore, in the
Eastern and Southern clusters, more participants found the dilemmas confusing than in the Western cluster (Table 2). The increased
confusion rates might have played a role in the fact that we found
no evidence for the personal force and intention interaction in the
speedboat dilemmas. Participants from the Southern and Eastern
clusters might have struggled to follow some versions of the speedboat dilemma, as it was originally written for US participants.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that collectivism would enhance the
effect of personal force and intention. This prediction was based on the
notion that collectivism increases the sensitivity to certain emotions
which mediate these effects. We found no evidence for this hypothesis when we executed our preregistered analysis plan. However, in
the exploratory analysis (with no exclusion criteria applied), we found
some moderate evidence for the association of country-level collectivism in the speedboat dilemma, and individual-level horizontal collectivism in the trolley dilemma with the interactional effect of personal
force and intention. Since this analysis was not preregistered, these
results should be interpreted cautiously.
The interaction between intention and personal force was sensitive to whether we included participants familiar with moral
dilemmas. In the Southern cluster, this led to inconclusive evidence
regarding the trolley problem, but contrary to our expectations, the
size of all of the interaction effects was larger when we included
familiar participants in the analysis. This increase could be due to
at least two reasons: (1) familiarity is not the main reason behind
the change in response patterns: familiarity correlates with an
as-yet-unknown underlying variable, which induces a selection bias
(for example, educational background), and (2) familiarity is the
main reason behind the change in response patterns: for example,
being familiar with the trolley problem might have caused people to
exhibit a lower emotional response to the problem or caused them
to apply different reasoning that ended up affecting their responses.
Our results cannot differentiate between the above-described explanations (which are not necessarily mutually exclusive).
Although we found no strong evidence for the association
between collectivism–individualism and the effects of personal
force and intention, future research should test for other cultural
variations. There are a number of interesting candidates that we did
not examine, including cultural tightness47 and social mobility48.
Our database provides opportunities to the field to examine different aspects and cultural moderators of moral judgement.
This research has a number of limitations that future work
will need to address. Although we call the personal force effect

‘universal’, it is only universal to the cultures we tested. This puts
a limit to the universality of the effects: we did not (nor did we
intend to) reach small-scale hunter–gatherer societies, for example.
Moreover, while our sample was more diverse and less WEIRD
than that of Greene et al.’s research, it consisted of mostly educated
individuals from younger age groups with internet access, raising
similar concerns (for example, still Educated and Industrialized,
and possibly Rich, though not strictly Western or Democratic).
Secondly, the data collection was conducted before and during
the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, which could have affected
the participants’ responding behaviour in some way (for example,
moral fatigue). Finally, 81% of the sample was not entered into the
main confirmatory analyses because of our exclusion criteria, which
might have resulted in unintended selection biases. For example,
it is possible that more educated participants were more likely to
be excluded because of being familiar with moral dilemmas from
college. It is also possible that people with less working memory
capacity or poor text comprehension abilities were more likely to
be excluded due to the stringent attention checks. This is why we
included an exploratory analysis in which we analysed data from
all of our participants, without applying any exclusions. Our results
on the full sample (with no exclusion criteria applied) supported
our previous conclusions (drawn based on the data with exclusions)
except in the cultural analysis, in which we found strong evidence
for cultural variations only when no data were excluded. Thus,
future work, especially replication work, should take caution when
applying stringent exclusion criteria as it may be entirely unnecessary and even hurt the discovery of new effects.
Another limitation of our study might come from the fact that
we used a single continuous measure of deontological–utilitarian
tendencies. Although common in the field, such an approach has
been criticized for being overly simplistic and not being able to pick
up on more complex response patterns49,50. For example, maximizing outcome and rejecting harm are not necessarily symmetrical
(as our continuous measure suggests). Hence, an interesting direction for future research could be to identify whether personal force
and intention increase reliance on deontological rules or decrease
reliance on consequentialist thinking. Methodological approaches,
such as process dissociation, are promising in this regard44.

Conclusion

With this replication study, we present empirical results about
how people around the world make judgements in moral dilemmas that have long interested moral philosophers and psychologists. Empirical studies in this field have been conducted mostly on
WEIRD samples, with little attention paid to cultural universality
and variations. Our research allows us to avoid some important
selection biases by having participants take the survey in their
native language from 45 countries. The shared dataset should allow
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Table 6 | The effect of intention on moral dilemma judgements (speedboat dilemmas)
Exclusion
Exclusion

Include familiar

No exclusion

Cluster

BF

t

df

p

Cohen’s d

Raw effect

89% CI

Eastern

10.6

−2.67

192.91

0.008

0.35

0.78

0.2–1.12

Southern

2.81 × 105

−5.51

407.77

<0.001

0.54

1.06

0.68–1.3

Western

3.15 × 10

−7.23

327.02

<0.001

0.54

1.09

0.81–1.31

Eastern

3.83 × 104

−4.99

319.39

<0.001

0.48

1.03

0.64–1.3

Southern

9.55 × 106

−6.10

872.90

<0.001

0.41

0.81

0.57–0.99

9

Western

2.51 × 10

−8.77

769.66

<0.001

0.43

0.84

0.68–0.98

Eastern

29.6

−3.06

1,062.72

0.002

0.17

0.38

0.18–0.56

Southern

1.83 × 107

−6.12

1,400.39

<0.001

0.29

0.60

0.43–0.74

Western

2.42 × 10

−7.65

3,006.15

<0.001

0.23

0.47

0.37–0.56

16

12

the assessment of different effects on moral dilemma judgements,
such as religion or second-language effects.
Overall, we found (1) the negative main effects of personal force
and intention on moral dilemma judgements are universal; (2) the
interaction between intention and personal force was replicated in
the Southern and Western clusters, finding people are less likely to
support sacrificing one person’s life for the sake of saving the lives of
several others, if they have both to intentionally engage in an action
to do this and to use personal force; and (3) this interaction is not
associated strongly with individual or country-level collectivism–
individualism measures.

Methods

Participants. A large, culturally and demographically diverse sample of participants
was recruited from collaborating laboratories through the Psychological Science
Accelerator51. The data collection team originally proposed to include 146
laboratories from 52 countries. All of these participating laboratories obtained
institutional review board approval (verified before the last round of stage 1
submission). Combined, these laboratories committed to collect a minimum of
18,637 participants. More laboratories were expected to be recruited before data
collection commenced. Each laboratory recruited participants for the study by
sending out the survey link along with the consent form to their participant pool
or online platforms (such as MTurk), or testing them in the research laboratory.
Due to some dropouts, the data collection team included 140 laboratories from
45 countries. Eligibility for participation was based on age (≥18 years) and being
a native speaker of the language of the test (more details on this criterion in
Controlling for possible confounds section). Data were collected either from local
university participant pools or via data collection platforms (for example, MTurk).
Altogether, 41,090 participants started our survey, and 27,502 finished it, whose
data were analysed (17,961 female, 7,956 male, mean age 26.0 years, s.d. 10.3 years;
study 1: 7,744 participants, 4,329 female, 2,487 male, mean age 26.8 years, s.d.
11.1 years; study 2: 19,340 participants, 13,632 female, 5,469 male, mean age
25.8 years, s.d. 9.98 years).
We did not collect any identifiable private data during the project that can be
linked to individual survey responses. Each laboratory ascertained the agreement
of the local institutional ethical review board with the proposed data collection.
This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The
institutional review board approvals are available on our OSF project page
(https://osf.io/j6kte/). Participants had to give informed consent before starting
the experiment. Only participants recruited through Mturk or Prolific received
monetary compensation.
Materials. Moral dilemmas. We used a total of six trolley dilemmas: footbridge
switch, standard footbridge, footbridge pole, loop, obstacle collide (taken from
Greene et al.) and standard switch. All the materials are provided in Supplementary
Methods Sections 1–3. Each of these scenarios represents a different condition.
For example, in the standard footbridge scenario, both intention and personal
force are required to push the man off the bridge. As in the original experiments,
every participant was assigned to only one of these dilemmas. The problems were
accompanied by a drawn sketch to aid understanding. Following the original
procedure, after presenting each problem, participants were asked whether the
described action (for example, pushing the man to save five people) is morally
acceptable or not (yes–no response). After this judgement, participants were
asked to indicate on a numbered Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (completely
unacceptable) to 9 (completely acceptable), the extent to which they think that
the given action is morally acceptable. Next, participants were asked to type
888

the justification of their decision in an open question format. After participants
were presented with the first trolley dilemma, they were presented with a second
dilemma from the same condition, without drawn sketches. For the second
dilemma, we used the speedboat dilemmas. These dilemmas are taken from studies
1b and 2b of Greene et al. and can be found in Supplementary Methods Section 1,
with the exception of the dilemmas in the obstacle collide and standard footbridge
conditions, which were provided by Joshua Greene during the review of the study.
The order of dilemma presentation was fixed, so that the trolley version was always
presented first. Study 1 was run before study 2, but participants were randomly
assigned to one of the dilemmas within each study.
Additional measures. Although an exploration of individual-level factors associated
with moral thinking is not the aim of the present research, to enrich our database
for future studies and secondary analyses, we expanded our survey with additional
individual-level measures: (1) total yearly household income, (2) place of living
(urban or rural area), (3) position on the four-dimensional Individualism–
Collectivism Scale38 (16 items) for disentangling cultural differences in participants’
responses52 and (4) religion (specific religion of the participant, plus one question
to measure their level of religiosity: “On a scale from 1 to 10, how religious are
you?”). Furthermore, we included the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale32 (nine items).
Following these questions, the participants’ level of education, age and sex were
also recorded. We also recorded the participants’ country of origin and whether the
participant came from an immigrant background.
Procedure. The experiment was administered by using a centralized online survey
that participants could answer remotely or in the laboratory. We used the original
instructions of Greene et al., as presented in Supplementary Methods Section
1. After responding to the dilemmas, participants were asked to answer three
questions: (1) a measure of careless responding (question about the specifics
of the trolley scenario), (2) whether they found the material confusing and
(3) whether they found the description of the problem realistic. After these
questions, participants were directed to our series of questionnaires: the Oxford
Utilitarianism Scale, followed by the Individualism–Collectivism Scale and the
measures of religion. Next, we administered the demographic questions (income,
place of living, country of origin, immigrant background, level of education,
age and sex). Afterwards, we asked three further questions to measure careless
responses, participants’ familiarity with research questions and finally for further
comments or any technical problems experienced.
Controlling for possible confounds. To avoid second-language effects on moral
judgement53, only native speakers of the language of the experiment could
participate. To ensure this, we asked participants to indicate their native
language(s). Bilingual participants could choose their preferred language. The data
from anyone with a native language different from the language of the survey were
removed from the analyses.
Following Greene et al.’s procedure, data from participants who reported that
they found the material confusing were excluded from the analyses. Data from
participants who reported having experienced technical problems during the
experiment were also excluded from all analyses. To avoid careless responses,
we added three bogus items at the end of the survey. We asked participants very
basic questions (for example, “I was born on February 30th.”) to which incorrect
answering indicates careless responding54. We excluded data from participants who
gave an incorrect response to any of these questions. Moreover, we introduced two
additional questions (presented immediately after the moral dilemmas), asking
participants about the specifics of the trolley and speedboat scenarios that they
had been presented with, to test whether they had paid attention when reading the
scenarios (referred to as attention check in the later test). Specifically, participants
were asked to select the option which most accurately described the situation that
they had been presented with. Each option described the nature of the physical
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action that was the key manipulation in the experiment. Because attention to
the trolley and speedboat dilemmas was measured by different questions,
when analysing the responses, we excluded the data for the correspondingly
failed attention check question. For example, people who gave a correct
response on the trolley but not on the speedboat attention check question were
included when analysing the trolley dilemma but excluded when analysing the
speedboat version.
As moral dilemmas are becoming more and more common in psychological
research and in summaries of this research in popular media and culture and
teaching, it is possible that some participants may have previous knowledge
of these dilemmas, which may affect their responses. To address this potential
problem, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked the following
question: “Before this experiment, were you familiar with moral dilemmas
of this kind, in which you can save more people by causing the death of one
person?” Answers were given on a rating scale from 1 (absolutely not familiar)
to 5 (absolutely familiar). Familiarity with the trolley problem or such moral
dilemmas (participants who responded with 4 or 5 on this scale) was used as a
further exclusion criterion. Additionally, participating laboratories were asked
to avoid recruiting philosophers or philosophy students because they are likely
to have heard about trolley problems, and we wanted to minimize the number of
participants to be excluded following data collection.
Notable deviations between this study and the design of Greene et al..
Besides the multinational data collection that forms the crux of our project, the
first important methodological difference between this study and the original
study is that the original study was conducted by paper and pencil, whereas
we administered the experiment online. Of note, recent research found no
evidence for a difference between the behaviour of participants who took part
in the experiment online versus those who took part in the experiment in a
laboratory. We also added one change in the introduction of the experiment (see
Supplementary Methods Section 1): participants were not given the opportunity to
ask the researcher any questions before the experiment (as the experiment can be
administered online, they did not have the opportunity to do so).
The second important change in this experiment is that participants were
presented with two moral dilemmas in one condition, instead of one. These
additional dilemmas will be analysed separately, as they were in the original
experiment. The third difference is that, for study 2, we used moral dilemmas
different from those that were used by Greene et al. The standard switch and
footbridge dilemmas were used instead of the loop weight and obstacle push
dilemmas, respectively. These dilemmas are not different from the ones used by
Greene et al. in their structural characteristics, only on surface characteristics.
That is, in the standard switch, the harm is unintended and no personal force is
required, while in the standard footbridge dilemma, the harm is intended and
requires personal force. By including the standard switch and standard footbridge
scenarios instead of the original ones, we gain further insight into the data.
Imagine, for example, that the personal force effect does not replicate in one of the
cultural clusters. One explanation for this is that people are simply not sensitive to
the effect of personal force in that cluster. However, it might also be the case that
utilitarian response rates to similar dilemmas increase over time55. If so, we should
see that the replicated difference between the standard footbridge and switch
dilemmas is shrinking or disappeared. Furthermore, by comparing the standard
footbridge with the footbridge pole dilemma, we can test the effect of physical
contact, and by comparing the standard switch case with the footbridge switch
case, confirm the effect of intention.
Finally, in the original experiment, Greene et al. excluded participants who did
not manage to suspend disbelief. Nevertheless, as they noted, this had no effect on
their results. Thus, we decided that we would not use this exclusion criterion.
Cultural classification of countries. To test the cultural universality hypothesis, a
comprehensive cultural classification that encompasses multiple sources of cultural
variability is needed. Hence, to assess our first hypothesis on the universality of the
effect of personal force and intention on moral judgements, we used the cultural
classification of Awad et al.39. On the basis of surveyed moral preferences, they
identified three distinct clusters of countries: Eastern, Southern and Western. They
argued that this cluster structure is broadly consistent with the alternative but more
complex Inglehart–Welzel cultural map38. Therefore, we assigned the countries of
our participating labs to these cultural clusters, as listed in Supplementary Methods
Section 1 and Supplementary Table S1.
Language adaptation. The participating laboratories translated the survey items
into the language of the participant pool, following the translation process of the
PSA (https://psysciacc.org/translation-process/) detailed below:
1.
2.
3.

Translation: The original document is translated from the source to target
language by A translators resulting in document version A.
Back-translation: Version A is translated back from the target to source
language by B translators independently, resulting in version B.
Discussion: Version A and B are discussed among translators and the
language coordinator, discrepancies in version A and B are detected and solutions are discussed. Version C is created.

4.

5.

External readings: Version C is tested on two non-academics fluent in the
target language. Members of the fluent group are asked how they perceive and
understand the translation. Possible misunderstandings are noted and again
discussed as in step 3.
Cultural adjustments: Data collection laboratories read the materials and
identify any adjustments needed for their local participant sample. Adjustments are discussed with the language coordinator, who makes any necessary
changes, resulting in the final version for each site.

Planned analyses. Preregistered analysis. Confirmatory replication analyses.
As explained in the introduction, we focused our analyses on the question of
the universality of Greene et al.’s two most important claims. We conducted
independent analyses in each cultural cluster and report them separately. We
preregistered the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: There is an effect of personal force on moral judgement in the
Western cluster (replication of the original effect).
Hypothesis 1b: If the effect of personal force is culturally universal, there is an
effect of personal force on the moral acceptability ratings (Greene et al., study 1) in
the Southern and Eastern cultural clusters as well.
Hypothesis 2a: There is an interaction between personal force and intention
(Greene et al., study 2) in the Western cluster (replication of original effects). More
specifically, the intention factor is larger when personal force is present compared
with when personal force is absent.
Hypothesis 2b: If this effect is culturally universal, there is an effect in the
Southern and Eastern cultural clusters as well.
Unlike in the original study, we employed Bayesian analyses to obtain
information from our data concerning the strength of evidence for the null and
alternative hypotheses. The BF indicates the relative evidence provided by the data
comparing two hypotheses56. Regarding the threshold of strong Bayesian evidence,
we followed the recommendations of ref. 57 and set the decision threshold of BF10
to >10 for H1 and <1/10 for H0. We used informed priors for the alternative
model: a one-tailed Cauchy distribution with a mode of zero and a scale of
r = 0.26 (hypotheses 1a and 1b) and r = 0.19 (hypotheses 2a and 2b) on the
standardized effect size using the BayesFactor package58 in R for the analysis. These
priors are based on the effect sizes that we expect to find as explained below in
the sample size estimation section. We implemented all of our analyses with the R
statistical software59.
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, we compared the moral acceptability ratings
given on the footbridge switch problem and footbridge pole dilemma, with the
moral acceptability rating of the footbridge switch dilemma expected to be higher.
More concretely, we performed three one-sided Bayesian t tests with the same
comparison in each cultural group. For each cultural cluster, we would conclude
that we replicated the original effect if BF10 > 10, we would conclude that we found
a null effect if BF10 < 1/10 and we would conclude that the results are inconclusive
if we find a BF10 in between these values (see below for a justification of these
thresholds).
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we tested the interaction of personal force
and intention in each cultural cluster, separately. We conducted Bayesian linear
regression analysis in each cultural cluster. The BF of interest is defined as the
quotient of the model including the interaction and two main effects (numerator)
and the model including only the two main effects (denominator). For each
cultural group, we would conclude that we replicated the original effect if the BF
of the interaction (BF10) > 10, we would conclude that we found a null effect if
BF10 < 1/10 and we would conclude that the results are inconclusive if we find a
BF10 between these values (see below for a justification of these thresholds). To
further understand the direction of the interaction, we plot the results in each
cultural cluster. To conclude the replication of the original effect, we should find
that the intention effect is higher in the personal force condition than in the
condition with no personal force.
Note that we conducted and reported the frequentist version of the proposed
analysis (for example, t tests for each hypothesis, for each cultural class) for the
sake of comparability of the original and our results. Nevertheless, we regarded the
results of our Bayesian analyses as the basis of our statistical inference. Although
we registered that the frequentist statistics would only be added as supplementary
material, we added it to the main text for easier comparability. No inference was
drawn from the frequentist statistics.
Test assumptions for the statistical tests (t tests and linear regressions) were
assumed to hold true, but they were not formally tested.
Robustness analyses. To probe the robustness of our conclusions to the scaling
factor of the Cauchy distribution used as the prior of H1, we report RRs for each
BF. RRs are notated as min–max, where min indicates the smallest and max
indicates the largest scaling factor that would lead us to the same conclusion as the
originally chosen scaling factor60.
Sampling plan and stopping rule. As the data were planned to be collected
globally, our knowledge was insufficient concerning the noise of the measurement
and the rate of exclusion in the various samples, which were needed for accurate
sample size estimation. For this reason, we proposed a sequential data acquisition.
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That is, first, to launch study 1 (hypotheses 1a and 1b), and collect data in
sequences from 500 participants per cluster per condition, from 3,000 participants
altogether (after all exclusions), then to stop data collection after each sequence.
At these stops, we would conduct our planned Bayesian analyses. Should the BF
reach the preset thresholds in a given cluster, we would stop data collection for
that cluster. If, in a cluster, the BF thresholds were not reached, we would continue
data collection with 200 additional participants per cluster per condition, then
re-analyse the data, repeating this procedure until one of the BF thresholds was
reached or the participant pool was exhausted. Note, however, that we deviated
from this sampling plan. See Deviations from registration section for details.
Should we not have reached this limit with our planned capacity of ~19,000
participants, we would have extended the data collection to a new semester.
In the case that we would have not reached our evidence threshold within
12 months, we would have reported our final results, acknowledging the limited
strength of the findings.
We launched study 2 data collection in a given cluster only when the analysis
of study 1 was conclusive. In study 2, we conducted the analysis only when we had
exhausted our resources.
Sample size estimation. To calculate our needs for data collection, we conducted
a rough sample size estimation. Assuming that the original effect size is found in
study 1 (d = 0.4), our sample size estimation indicated that we would require 500
participants per condition per cluster (3,000 altogether), while if the original effect
size is to be found in study 2 (d = 0.28), our estimation indicated that we would
need 1,800 participants per condition per cluster (21,600 altogether for study 2) to
obtain 95% power in detecting the effect. A detailed description of the sample size
estimation can be found in Supplementary Methods Section 4.
Testing the association between country-level collectivism and the effects of
personal force and intention. Our third hypothesis proposed that collectivism
increases the effects of personal force and intention. As a measure of country-level
individualism and collectivism, we added the collectivism measure from the
Cultural Distance WEIRD scale (countries’ differences in terms of individualism
from the United States)61 as a continuous variable to our model. We tested
whether collectivism interacted with personal force and intention (hypothesis
3), as explained in the introduction. Hypothesis 3 expected to find a three-way
interaction between collectivism, intention and personal force, for which we used
the dilemmas we used to test hypotheses 2a and 2b. In this analysis, we used a
Cauchy distribution with a scale of r = 0.37 (the same as used to test hypotheses
2a and 2b, that is, the test of the interaction) as prior. Should we find evidence for
null effect (BF < 1/10) of the interaction of individualism−collectivism, personal
force and intention, we would conclude that individualism–collectivism does not
moderate the effect of personal force and intention.
Analysis of the additional moral dilemmas. Study 1. As explained above, each
participant had to give a response on two moral dilemmas. For study 1 (effect of
personal force), we conducted the same analysis on the rest of the moral dilemmas,
without the trolley versions, as in the original study (Greene et al., study 1b).
Study 2. We conducted the same analysis (interaction of personal force and
intention) on the rest of speedboat dilemmas, without the trolley versions.
Further tests. Effect of physical contact and intention. With this set of items, we
were able to assess the effect of physical contact, by comparing the standard
footbridge and footbridge pole dilemmas. We also assessed the effect of intention
by comparing the standard switch case with the footbridge switch case. These
analyses were done in every cluster, and we used Bayesian t tests for these
comparisons. We used the same prior that we used for the assessment of the effect
of physical force (r = 0.26). This analysis was done separately on the trolley and
speedboat dilemmas.
Comparing the standard switch and standard footbridge dilemmas. For the reasons
explained earlier, we compared the standard footbridge and standard switch
dilemmas, in each cultural cluster. For this, we conducted a Bayesian t test,
with the same prior previously used for the assessment of the effect of physical
force (d = 0.26). This analysis was done separately for the trolley and speedboat
dilemmas.
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. We computed a figure showing the response
distribution of each subscale of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale43 for each cultural
cluster to explore potential cultural differences (along with means and 95% CI).
The results of this can be found in Supplementary Analysis Section 2.4.
Individual-level horizontal and vertical individualism–collectivism. Triandis and
Gelfand49 defined individualistic and collectivistic cultural tendencies using four
dimensions: vertical individualism, vertical collectivism, horizontal individualism
and horizontal collectivism. We added these continuous measures to our
Bayesian linear regression analysis. The predictive power of all four measures
was assessed separately.
890

Including familiar participants. A potentially large number of participants were
excluded due to familiarity with the trolley dilemma, and there was a possibility
that this exclusion criterion would affect the data from some countries or cultural
clusters more than others. To avoid this potential sampling bias, we computed all
the above-listed analyses on moral dilemmas (confirmatory and exploratory) on
the full sample from which we did not exclude the participants familiar with moral
dilemmas. Second, we computed all analyses specifically on data coming from
people who were familiar with moral dilemmas, to compare the results of familiar
and unfamiliar participants. This latter analysis can be found in Supplementary
Analysis Section 2.3 and was limited to the confirmatory hypothesis tests.
Pilot testing. To ascertain that the survey software operated without any technical
problems, we planned to conduct a pilot test in which each participating laboratory
would have been expected to collect data from ten participants. We would have
only assessed the expected functioning of the survey software, without analysing
the collected data.
Timeline. We planned to finish data collection within 6 months from stage 1
in-principle acceptance, and we planned to submit our report within 1 month
from then.
Deviations from registration. We preregistered that we would collect data from
3,000 participants for study 1 (test of personal force; hypotheses 1a and 1b), after
exclusions. Unexpectedly, the exclusion criteria led to 80.6% exclusion of our
collected data. At the point when this was realized, it seemed likely that study 1
would exhaust the available sample pool, not leaving capacity for study 2. Therefore,
with the agreement of the journal editor, we decided to collect participants for study
1 only until our BF evidence thresholds were reached after all exclusion criteria
were applied. This modification allowed us to collect data for study 2 as well.
At the time of this decision, the distribution of responses has been taken into
account: We had collected data from 3,473 participants: 1,319 from the Western
cluster, 1,762 from the Southern cluster and 392 from the Eastern cluster. After
exclusions, 789 participants remained (78% excluded): 296 from the Western
cluster (78% excluded), 429 from the Southern cluster (76% excluded) and 64 from
the Eastern cluster (84% excluded).
Instead of conducting a pilot study as preregistered, to avoid wasting any
(much needed) participants, participating researchers from all laboratories tested
the experiment before it was sent out to ensure that there were no grammatical
mistakes or functionality problems.
Due to the coronavirus disease 2019 crisis, data collection took 6 months longer
than expected (with the agreement of the editor).
Exploratory analysis. During the data pre-processing, we excluded 229
participants from three US-based laboratories as they received a wrong survey
link. Furthermore, 13,359 participants started but did not finish the experiment,
therefore their data were also dropped from further analyses. These participants
did not count towards our final sample and are not part of the data in any
way. The final sample used for data analyses consisted of 27,502 participants.
Further information on the demographics of our participants can be found in
Supplementary Analysis Section 1.
Note that we limited the use of RRs for the confirmatory hypothesis tests.
Protocol registration information. The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report
was accepted in principle on 30 January 2020. The protocol, as accepted by the
journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.11871324.v1.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in the
Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

Data availability

Collected anonymized raw and processed data are publicly shared on the
Github page of the project: https://github.com/marton-balazs-kovacs/
trolleyMultilabReplication/tree/master/data.

Code availability

Code for data management and statistical analyses have been written in R and are
available at https://github.com/marton-balazs-kovacs/trolleyMultilabReplication.
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Extended Data Fig. 1 | Effect of physical force on moral dilemma judgments, no exclusion criteria applied. Results in Study 1 (effect of personal force
without applying any exclusion criteria) on the Trolley (a) and Speedboat dilemma (b). Error bars are 95% Confidence Intervals around the mean. Scale
ranged from 1 (completely unacceptable) to 9 (completely acceptable), n = 7,744.

Nature Human Behaviour | www.nature.com/nathumbehav

NaTUrE HUMan BEhaviOUr

Registered Report

Extended Data Fig. 2 | The effect of personal force on moral dilemma judgements (without applying any exclusion criteria).
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Extended Data Fig. 3 | Interaction between personal force and intention on moral judgments (without applying any exclusion criteria).
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Extended Data Fig. 4 | Effect of physical force and intention on moral dilemma judgments, no exclusion criteria applied. Results in Study 2 (personal
force and intention interaction without applying any exclusion criteria) on the Trolley (a) and Speedboat dilemma (b). Error bars represent 95%
Confidence Intervals. Scale ranged from 1 (completely unacceptable) to 9 (completely acceptable), n = 19,340.
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Extended Data Fig. 5 | Correlation between country level collectivism and personal force and intention interaction effect size, no exclusion criteria
applied. Correlation between country-level collectivism and the Eta squared effect size of the interaction between personal force and intention with no
exclusion criteria applied on the Trolley (a) and Speedboat dilemma (b). The size of the circles indicate the size of the sample in a given country. Blue line
is the weighted regression line.
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Extended Data Fig. 6 | Individualism/collectivism associations with the interaction between personal force and intention on moral judgments (without
applying any exclusion criteria).
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- Accession codes, unique identifiers, or web links for publicly available datasets
- A description of any restrictions on data availability
- For clinical datasets or third party data, please ensure that the statement adheres to our policy
Anonim data is made open and available at the following address: https://github.com/marton-balazs-kovacs/trolleyMultilabReplication/tree/master/data
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Behavioural & social sciences study design
All studies must disclose on these points even when the disclosure is negative.
Study description

Data are quantitative.

Research sample

Overall, we obtained data from 27502 participants (17961 females, 7956 males, Mean age = 26.0 years, SD = 10.3 years; Study 1:
7744 participants, 4329 females, 2487 males, Mean age = 26.8 years, SD = 11.1 years; Study 2: 19340 participants, 13632 females,
5469 males, Mean age = 25.8 years, SD = 9.98 years). The sample is diverse, mostly university students. The sample was obtained
from 45 countries in 33 languages. A lengthy demographic description of the sample organized by country can be found in the
Supplementary Analysis (Table 1). The participating labs used their student pools, online participant pools (Mturk, Prolific) or
convenience samples to obtain their sample.

Sampling strategy

Sampling strategy was convenience sampling. We used simulation based power analysis and planned for 95% of power, with Bayes
Factor thresholds 10 and 1/10. Data collection for Study 2 only started after we reached one of the BF thresholds in Study 1 in a given
cultural cluster.

Data collection

The experiment was conducted online, using the survey software, Qualtrics. Participants could fill out the experiments from home.

Timing

Start date: 2020.04.15, End date: 2021.01.11

Data exclusions

All exclusion criteria were registered, no others were added after Stage 1 registration was accepted. We excluded 80.6% of our
sample for the main confirmatory analysis. However, we also conducted an exploratory analysis without excluding any participants.
This information is included in the manuscript, with a table (Table 2) detailing all exclusions.

Non-participation

41,090 participants started the experiment, but 13,359 did not finish it (for reasons unknown). Their data were not analysed.

Randomization

Participants were randomly assigned to one or the other experimental group within a study (but Study 1 was conducted before Study
2).
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Methods
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Human research participants
Clinical data
Dual use research of concern

Policy information about studies involving human research participants
Population characteristics

We obtained data from 27502 participants (17961 females, 7956 males, Mean age = 26.0 years, SD = 10.3 years; Study 1:
7744 participants, 4329 females, 2487 males, Mean age = 26.8 years, SD = 11.1 years; Study 2: 19340 participants, 13632
females, 5469 males, Mean age = 25.8 years, SD = 9.98 years)

Recruitment

articipants were recruited online. Each participating lab used their convenience (student) sample. This convenience sample is
not representative of a country's population.
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Ethics oversight

Note that full information on the approval of the study protocol must also be provided in the manuscript.
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The research Ethics committee of the Faculty of Pedagogy and Psychology (ELTE) granted a central permission (permission
nr: 2019/47). Many other labs obtained IRB approval too, which approvals can be found here: https://osf.io/j6kte/ .
Participants had to give informed consent before starting the experiment. Only participants recruited through Mturk or
Prolific received monetary compensation.
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